This week I reviewed the International Renewable Energy Agency's (IRENA) figures for Syria up to 2025, and they contain some noteworthy points.
The installed renewable capacity reached 3,806 MW by the end of 2025, compared to 1,501 MW in 2016. But the number alone doesn't tell the whole story. The real story lies in its timeline.
Between 2016 and 2021, capacity practically stagnated. It remained around 1,500 MW, almost entirely hydroelectric. Then, in 2022, the shift began and hasn't stopped.
The driving force is one: solar energy. From 33 MW in 2021 to 2,249 MW in 2025. And in 2024, solar surpassed hydroelectric for the first time in the sector's history. Wind power remained at 5 MW and biomass at 7 MW, with little change.
With this capacity, Syria ranks fifth in the Arab world.
The paradox here is that actual production in 2024 reached 862 gigawatt-hours, less than the 902 gigawatt-hours produced in 2016. Capacity doubled, yet production declined.
In my estimation, the reason isn't poor performance, but rather poor measurement. More than half the capacity (54% in 2025) is off-grid—panels on the roofs of houses, shops, and workshops, which aren't metered or included in the statistics. For comparison: every megawatt of solar power in Jordan produces 2,178 megawatt-hours annually, and in Syria, 79. The difference isn't due to the amount of sunshine.
My conclusion: this expansion wasn't driven by a plan, but by people buying panels because of power outages. It's a real shift, but it poses a different question for those planning the sector—not how to add capacity, but how to measure and connect existing capacity.
statistics