Chinese Solar Panel Imports to Syria: A Surge Driven by Crisis, Not Market Maturity
Nearly a decade of Chinese customs data shows Syria moving from a small and volatile solar panel market into a period of clear acceleration beginning in 2025.
Although Syria remains near the bottom of the Arab ranking in terms of cumulative import volume, the growth recorded during 2025 and the first four months of 2026 points to a significant market shift that deserves closer examination.
Between January 2017 and April 2026, Syria imported approximately 181.4 MW of finished Chinese solar panels. The total rises to around 205.8 MW when solar cells and wafers are included, although these are industrial inputs rather than finished products ready for installation.
The figures are based on Ember’s China solar export dataset, which uses monthly Chinese customs data. Syrian Renewables processed, filtered and analysed the data.
A crucial distinction must nevertheless be maintained: the figures measure the nominal capacity of products exported from China and recorded at the customs border. They do not measure the amount of solar capacity installed, connected or operational inside Syria.
Executive Summary
Syria imported a cumulative 181.4 MW of finished Chinese solar panels between 2017 and April 2026.
Following several years in which annual imports fluctuated between approximately 7 MW and 24 MW, imports increased to 41.7 MW in 2025. This was the highest annual level in the dataset and more than six times the 6.94 MW recorded in 2024.
The expansion continued in early 2026. Syria imported 31.9 MW in only four months, from January to April. April alone set a monthly record of 18.36 MW.
Across the Arab region, Syria ranked 18th out of 22 countries over the full period, accounting for only 0.17% of total Arab imports of Chinese solar panels.
However, Syria’s share increased from approximately 0.14% in 2025 to around 0.47% during the first four months of 2026, while its ranking improved to 16th during that partial period.
Import-price data indicate that Syria’s average panel price in 2025 was approximately USD 0.096 per watt, almost identical to the weighted Arab average of USD 0.095 per watt.
This suggests that the high final cost of solar systems in Syria is not primarily caused by the panel import price. Batteries, inverters, freight, financing, installation, duties and domestic market margins remain major cost components.
The Development of Syria’s Imports
The time series forms a broadly U-shaped curve.
During the first phase, between 2017 and 2020, annual imports ranged from approximately 13 MW to 24 MW. An early peak of 24.44 MW was recorded in 2019.
This demand emerged in a context of declining electricity reliability and growing dependence on alternative energy systems in areas facing prolonged outages or unstable grid supply.
Between 2021 and 2024, the market entered a contraction phase. Imports fell to:
- 8.99 MW in 2021.
- 9.15 MW in 2022.
- 9.24 MW in 2023.
- 6.94 MW in 2024.
The 2024 figure was the lowest level in the entire series, amid declining purchasing power and continuing difficulties related to financing, imports and external trade.
The decisive turning point came in 2025, when finished-panel imports rose to 41.7 MW, approximately six times the level recorded one year earlier.
The increase was not temporary. During the first four months of 2026, imports reached 31.91 MW, equivalent to almost three-quarters of Syria’s total imports in 2025.
The Monthly Trend in 2026
The significance of the 2026 data lies not only in the total volume, but also in the continuous month-to-month acceleration:
- January: 0.79 MW.
- February: 4.34 MW.
- March: 8.42 MW.
- April: 18.36 MW.
Imports in April alone exceeded the annual total recorded in each year from 2021 to 2024.
The increase coincides with the continuing electricity crisis, limited grid-supply hours and growing reliance by households, shops, workshops, agricultural operations, water pumps, aid organisations and public-service facilities on decentralised solar systems.
When the grid cannot meet demand, consumers increasingly turn to individual solutions. This shift becomes visible in customs and trade data.
Syria in the Arab Context
The 22 Arab countries collectively imported approximately 104 GW of finished Chinese solar panels between 2017 and April 2026.
The regional market is highly concentrated. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates alone accounted for approximately 59% of total Arab imports.
Saudi Arabia imported around 35.4 GW, while the UAE imported approximately 25.9 GW. Egypt, Oman, Jordan, Morocco and Iraq formed a second group of medium and large markets.
Syria’s cumulative imports of 181.4 MW placed it 18th out of 22 countries, with a share of only 0.17%.
The cumulative ranking, however, does not fully capture the recent change. Syria ranked 17th in 2025, while its share during the first months of 2026 more than tripled and its ranking improved to 16th for that partial period.
This does not make Syria a large market in absolute terms, but it places the country among the Arab markets that recorded particularly rapid relative growth in early 2026.
Prices: Syria Compared with the Arab Average
Chinese solar panel export prices declined sharply during the past several years due to the expansion of Chinese manufacturing capacity, excess supply and intense global price competition.
Syria’s average import price declined from levels close to USD 0.28 per watt in 2022 to approximately USD 0.096 per watt in 2025.
Across the entire period, Syria’s cumulative average price was approximately USD 0.197 per watt, compared with a weighted Arab average of USD 0.154 per watt.
This difference does not necessarily indicate that Syrian importers consistently paid a price premium.
A larger share of Syria’s cumulative imports took place during the earlier years, when global solar panel prices were higher. By contrast, major Arab markets imported much of their volume during 2024 and 2025, after prices had fallen substantially.
When prices are compared on a year-by-year basis, the Syrian and Arab averages are very similar. In 2025, the Syrian price was approximately USD 0.096 per watt, compared with a weighted Arab average of USD 0.095 per watt.
Panels Are Cheap, but Complete Systems Are Not
A lower panel price does not mean that complete solar systems have become affordable for all households and businesses.
The final system cost also includes:
- Batteries.
- Inverters.
- Mounting structures.
- Cables and electrical protection.
- Freight and domestic transport.
- Installation and maintenance.
- Financing costs.
- Duties and taxes.
- Importer and distributor margins.
In many residential and commercial systems, the combined cost of batteries, inverters and installation may exceed the cost of the panels themselves.
Falling panel prices are therefore an important condition for market expansion, but they are not sufficient on their own to make solar energy broadly affordable.
Syria Compared with Neighbouring Markets
Syria remains a small market compared with several neighbouring countries.
Over the period covered by the data, imports reached:
- Jordan: 5.15 GW.
- Iraq: 3.06 GW.
- Lebanon: 2.56 GW.
- Syria: 181.4 MW.
- Palestine: 53.2 MW.
The import volumes of Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon were each more than an order of magnitude larger than Syria’s.
This gap does not reflect differences in latent demand alone. It also reflects differences in access to international markets, financing, shipping and established import channels.
Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon maintained relatively more stable import and financing channels during much of the period, while the Syrian market faced sanctions, banking restrictions, external-trade constraints and a relatively limited import structure.
Economic and Political Interpretation
The 2025 surge cannot be explained by electricity demand alone, because demand for alternative electricity supplies had already been high for several years.
The more likely change was the market’s ability to respond to that demand.
In previous years, the principal constraints were not limited to panel prices or the absence of demand. They also included difficulties related to financing, bank transfers, shipping, customs clearance and access to international suppliers, as well as the concentration of import channels among a limited number of market actors.
Following the transitional period that began after December 2024, some commercial and financial constraints may have gradually eased, while the number of companies and traders able to import equipment may have expanded.
The post-2025 growth can therefore be interpreted as the result of two interacting factors:
- Large decentralised demand created by a structural electricity crisis.
- A relative improvement in the ability of traders and companies to access equipment and external markets.
This remains an analytical interpretation based on the direction of the data and the wider market context. Chinese customs data do not identify Syrian importers or provide direct information about financing and domestic market structures.
What Import Data Cannot Tell Us
The data do not identify:
- Where the panels were installed inside Syria.
- How many panels became operational.
- How much equipment remains in importer or distributor inventories.
- The distribution of systems between residential, commercial, agricultural, industrial and service-sector users.
- The volume of used panels or panels imported through intermediary countries.
- Imports originating from countries other than China.
- Domestic production or assembly.
- Grid-connected capacity.
- Actual operational capacity.
Some panels may remain in storage, be allocated to projects that are not completed because of missing batteries, inverters or financing, or replace older panels rather than add entirely new capacity.
Import volumes must therefore not be converted directly into installed or operational capacity.
Conclusion
Within the Arab context, Syria remains a small market for Chinese solar panels. Its import volumes are far below those of the largest Arab markets and several neighbouring countries.
However, the drivers of growth in Syria are distinctive.
The market is not primarily being driven by a large centralised government programme or a boom in utility-scale solar farms. It is being driven by a deep electricity crisis and decentralised demand from households, businesses, agricultural users and service facilities.
The data for 2025 and early 2026 indicate that the market has entered a new phase of expansion, characterised by a substantial rise in imports and unprecedented monthly acceleration.
The limitations of the data remain decisive. The figures document panels entering the trade chain through Chinese customs, not their installation or operation inside Syria.
The increase is real and verifiable at the external-trade border, but its translation into installed and operational megawatts remains an open question requiring local datasets, installation records and field surveys.
Methodology and Data Limitations
The figures are based on Ember’s China solar export dataset, which uses monthly Chinese customs data.
The dataset includes three principal product categories:
- Finished solar panels.
- Solar cells.
- Solar wafers.
The comparison between Arab countries uses finished panels only, because these products can be directly installed, while cells and wafers are industrial inputs.
The 2026 figures cover January to April only. They do not represent a full year and have not been linearly extrapolated.
The reported MW values represent the approximate nominal capacity of exported products under the dataset’s methodology. They do not represent installed capacity, available capacity, operational capacity or actual electricity generation.